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INTRODUCTION 
In her review and assessment of the sociology of law, Arlene 
Sheskin argues that Pound, Ehrlich and Timasheff make certain 
assumptions about the law which are common in sociological 
jurisprudence and the sociology of law, but which preclude more 
accurate explanations of legal phenomena. According to Sheskin, 
traditional theories and research in the sociology of law assume 
among other things that: 1) the law neutrally reflects the common 
interests of the populace; and 2) conformity to the law is based on 
consensus. Sheskin suggests that more accurate and complete 
theories of law can be developed if we reject these traditional 
assumptions and recognize that: 1) the law is determined by and 
reflects the interests of the economically dominant classes; and 
2) conformity to the law is often based on power and coercion. 
Sheskin is not alone in her assessment of the predominant 
assumptions underlying the sociology of law, or in her suggestion 
of an alternative approach to the study of legal phenomena. Elliott 
Currie, for example, writes that the dominant model of law and 
society in contemporary legal sociology is "a pluralist and 
meliorist interpretation of American society and the American 
legal system, intellectually rooted in classical bourgeois sociology 
and in liberal jurisprudence" (1971:137). He contends that some 
of the most important presuppositions in the sociology of law 
include the conception of law as the outcome of pluralistic 
competition among various groups, and the tendency to view legal 
institutions in isolation from the broader framework of 
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domination and exploitation within which they function 
(1971:143). He also recommends as an alternative to the 
traditional approach a Marxian analysis which emphasizes law as 
an instrument of power and/or of class domination. 
Likewise, Richard Quinney (1974:22-24) asserts that the 
sociology of law presents a particular image of the role of law in 
society to the exclusion of other possibilities. In this particular 
image, the law serves those interests that are for the good of the 
whole society, and it orders human relations by restraining 
individual actions and by settling disputes between competing 
groups. Quinney sets forth an alternative to this image of law—one 
which recognizes that, contrary to pluralist assumptions, the law is 
determined by only a few groups representing a power elite. 
Although the law is supposed to protect all citizens, says Quinney, 
it actually develops as a tool of the dominant class and serves to 
maintain the dominance ofthat class. 
My disagreement with Shcskin, Currie, and Quinney is not 
that their alternative conception of law is no more useful than the 
conception which they criticize. My purpose here is not to defend 
the pluralist—consensus image of law, but rather to argue that this 
image is not as dominant as Shcskin and others would lead us to 
believe. My argument is simply that Sheskin and others have 
understated the extent to which sociologists and sociological 
jurisprudents have recognized the crucial importance of power, 
economics and politics in the creation and enforcement of the law. 
I will attempt to illustrate my point by briefly reviewing the work 
of four leading jurisprudents and sociologists: l ) J o h n Austin; 
2) Eugen Ehrlich; 3) Nicholas Timasheff; and 4) Max Weber. 
JOHN AUSTIN 
John Austin was one of the founders of the analytical school 
of jurisprudence. This school is chiefly concerned with the judicial 
process and the force and constraint behind legal rules. Austin's 
work remains the most comprehensive and important attempt to 
formulate a system of analytical legal positivism in the context of 
the modern state. Austin's most important contribution to legal 
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theory was his substitution of the state for any ideal of justice in 
the definition of law. 
The sociological school of jurisprudence developed in part 
from a dissatisfaction with the approach of the analytical school. 
Thus, a brief look at Austin's conception oflaw will shed some 
light on the concerns and assumptions of the sociological school. 
An examination of Austin's work will also be helpful because it 
has influenced the image of law adopted by several sociologists 
and anthropologists (Gibbs, 1973; Hoebel, 1973; Radcliffe-Brown, 
1952; Pospisil, 1972). 
According to Austin (1954:10-25), the law consists of rules 
set by political superiors and binding on political inferiors. Austin 
did not use the term "superiority" in the sense of excellence, but 
in the sense of might—"the power of affecting others with evil or 
pain, and of forcing them, through fear of that evil, to fashion 
their conduct to one's wishes" (1954:24). Political superiors, in 
Austin's view, are those who exercise supreme or superordinate 
government, and only the rules which are laid down by these 
political superiors may properly be called law. 
Austin did not assume that the law neutrally reflects the 
common interests of the populace, or that it is the outcome of 
pluralistic competition among various groups, or that conformity 
to the law is based on consensus. On the contrary, Austin's 
conception oflaw assumes that the law reflects the interests of the 
political superiors, that political superiors lay down legal rules and 
force others to obey them through the threat of force, and that 
conformity to the law is based on fear of coercion. 
Although Austin did not equate the political superiors with 
the dominant economic classes, his image oflaw is certainly more 
compatible with the image suggested by Sheskin than with the 
pluralist-consensus one. Austin, at least, cannot be accused of 
failing to recognize the crucial importance of power and politics in 
the creation and enforcement of the law. 
EUGEN EHRLICH 
As Sheskin noted in her paper, Eugen Ehrlich was one of the 
founders of sociological jurisprudence. Ehrlich rejected the 
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traditional notion advanced by the analytical school that the law 
only consists of legislative statutes created by the state and of 
judicial decisions made by a court or other tribunal (1936:24). 
For Ehrlich, law in the true sense of the term is "law which is not 
imprisoned in rules of law, but which dominates life itself" 
(1914:48). Ehrlich defined law not in terms of statutes or judicial 
decisions, but in terms of an ordering of social relations. 
| W | c may consider it established that, within the scope of the 
concept of the association, the law is an organization, that is to say, 
a rule which assigns to each and every member o f the association 
his position in the community, whether it be of domination or of 
subjection, and his duties (1936:24). 
Ehrlich referred to law defined in these terms as the "living law," 
so as to distinguish it from the traditional image of law defined in 
terms of statutes or judicial decisions. 
Because of his conception of law as an ordering of social 
relations within an association, Ehrlich did not accept the view 
that the origin of legal rules can be exclusively explained in terms 
of a dominant minority which establishes and enforces legal rules 
to further its own interest. First of all, Ehrlich pointed out, it is 
impossible to state exhaustively the interests which motivate 
human conduct. 
Second, and more important, the interests of the dominant 
minority must coincide to a certain extent with the interests of at 
least a majority of the other members of the association, or else 
the other members would not obey the rules established by the 
dominant minority. Ehrlich contended that if the masses were to 
disobey the legal rules established by the dominant minority, the 
association would dissolve because the dominant minority would 
not have sufficient means at its disposal to subdue the resisting 
majority. And if the association were to dissolve, Ehrlich 
maintained, the non-dominant majority would suffer because even 
an association which imposes heavy burdens on them is better 
than no order at all (1936:61-62, 76). Ehrlich concludes his 
position by saying: 
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If therefore the great majority of human bcings-and this includes, 
as can be readily seen, the whole working class-render obedience 
to the legal order, they undoubtedly must be actuated by a very 
strong conviction, though not perhaps a clear understanding, that it 
is necessary to do this-necessary in order to secure their own 
interests (1936:76). 
Although Ehrlich did not believe that the law is exclusively 
determined by and reflects the interests of the dominant minority, 
he did recognize that the law can be a tool of domination, and 
that all groups do not have equal power in creating and enforcing 
legal norms. Ehrlich believed that relationships of domination and 
subjection .exist in all stages of social development, and that such 
relationships are a constituent part of the legal order (1936:88). In 
fact, Ehrlich suggested that if we wish to acquire knowledge of the 
living law, we must study the "facts of the law," including the 
relations of domination which exist in society (1936:169, 
501-502). 
Ehrlich distinguished between relations of domination which 
exist in the association and those which exist in society as a whole. 
In regard to the relations of domination which exist in the 
association, Ehrlich made a further distinction between these 
relations and relations of superiority and inferiority. According to 
Ehrlich, a command issued by a person occupying a position of 
superiority is made on behalf of the association, and the person 
occupying the position of inferiority obeys the command with a 
consciousness of serving the association. 
In contrast, a command issued by a person who has the 
power of domination is made to further his own interests, and the 
person who is in the position of subjection is conscious primarily 
of serving the person to whom he is subjected. Moreover, while the 
association remains unitary in spite of the relations of superiority 
and inferiority, the relations of domination divide the association 
into rulers and ruled. In an association organized in terms of 
domination and subjection, the rulers and often the ruled form 
sub-associations of their own within the framework of the larger 
association (1936:87-88). 
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Although each association within society may contain 
relations of domination and subjection, Ehrlich asserted that 
society as a whole is organized in terms of differential power 
relationships to a much greater extent than the associations of 
which it is composed. 
[Ejach society has legal norms of general validity through which it 
acts upon the order of the associations of which it is composed. We 
find everywhere not only individuals who are placed under a 
disadvantage by society, but also associations which are slighted, 
outlawed, persecuted, e.g., marital relations; certain kinds of 
families; peoples; religious communities; political parties, to whom 
society makes life a burden. . . . The inner order of society, to a 
much greater extent than the inner order of the associations, bears 
die stamp of an order of domination, of conflict. To a great extent, 
it is the expression of the relation of the associations that rule in 
society to those that are being ruled and of the struggle of the 
associations that constitute organized society with those that refuse 
to be fitted into the organization (1936:152) . 
Not only did Ehrlich recognize that relationships of 
domination and subjection are a constituent part of the legal 
order, he also understood that the content of the law is 
determined to a great extent by the structure of the economic 
system. 
Inasmuch as the law is an inner order of the social associations, its 
content is determined with absolute necessity by the structure of 
these associations and by their method of conducting their 
economic enterprises. Every social and economic change causes a 
change in the law, and it is impossible to change the legal bases of 
society and of economic life without bringing about a 
corresponding change in the law (1936:52-53). 
While recognizing the importance of the economic order in 
determining the content of the law, Ehrlich argued that it would 
be a great mistake to consider only economic phenomena and to 
ignore all other social phenomena. According to Ehrlich, the state, 
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the church, education, art, science, and entertainment all play a 
role in the life of society and in the development of the law no less 
important than that of economic labor. These non-economic 
factors have a pervasive influence on the relations of domination 
and subjection, and on the law of possession and contract. 
Nevertheless, Ehrlich warns, we must not forget that the 
economic situation is the presupposition for every form of 
non-economic activity, and that an understanding of the economic 
order is the basis for an understanding of the other parts of 
society, especially the legal order (1936:115-16). 
In sum, Ehrlich did not assume that the law neutrally reflects 
the common interests of the populace, nor that conformity to the 
law is based on consensus. On the contrary, Ehrlich maintained 
that the law primarily, but not exclusively, reflects the interests of 
the ruling associations in society; that conformity to the law is 
often based on relations of domination and subjection; that 
society to a great extent is an order of domination and conflict; 
and that the structure of the economic system is a major, but not 
the only, determinant of the content of the law. 
NICHOLAS T1MASHEFF 
Timasheff, one of the first sociologists to study legal 
phenomena, defined law in terms of two other forms of social 
coordination: ethics and power. According to Timasheff, ethics 
are a social force because ethical values are embodied in human 
attitudes and behavior through group-conviction - the similar 
conviction of group members which emerges from social 
interaction. Group-conviction is ethical to the extent that its 
content is the evaluation of social behavior from the standpoint of 
'duty" (1939:14, 73-74). 
Power, Timasheff's second form of social coordination, is 
based not on consensus, but on attitudes of dominance and 
submission. In some social groups, Timasheff contended, a small 
number of members possess centralized power which they use to 
impose patterns of conduct on the rest of the group. Such power 
may exist either as an active process or as a latent disposition. 
Power exists as an active process when commands are made by the 
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dominators and acts of obedience arc performed by their subjects; 
it exists as a latent disposition when this sequence of events is 
repeated and acts of submission become habitual (1936:13-14, 
179-80). 
Timasheff believed that it was natural for ethics and power to 
combine to form a system which simultaneously includes the 
features of both. This combination of ethics and power is what 
Timashcff defined as law. 
Legal rules are ethical rules or norms. . .for every legal pattern of 
conduct can be expressed in a proposition with the predicate 
'ought to be'. At the same time legal patterns of conduct are 
supported by centralized power and its coordinating activity, and 
not merely by the mutual social interaction which produces and 
reinforces the ethical group-conviction (1939:15). 
Timashcff based his conception of law as the union of ethics 
and power on four propositions: 1) legal rules are recognized by 
group members; 2) legal rules are obeyed by group members; 
3) legal rules are recognized by the members of active power 
centers; and 4) legal rules are supported by the members of active 
power centers (1939:248). TimahefPs second and fourth 
propositions are the most relevant here because they demonstrate 
that Timasheff recognized the importance of power in the creation 
and enforcement of the law. 
Timasheff expanded his second proposition by stating that 
legal rules are obeyed by group members "as the generalized 
commands of the rulers within certain power structures" 
(1939:253). Timashcff noted that modern jurists often deny the 
proposition that legal rules are obeyed. They assert that legal rules 
are not commands, but directions for proper conduct. Timasheff 
rejected this assertion on the ground that if legal rules are merely 
"directions," they are indistinguishable from friendly advice. The 
only way to make this important distinction, Timasheff argued, is 
by reference to power structures: "legal rules always express 
dominance and therefore, they are commands" (1939:253). 
Timashcff identified three specific motivations for obeying 
legal rules: the direct imperative motivation, the direct attributive 
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motivation, and the indirect motivation (1939:253). For our 
purposes here, the first is the most pertinent. Timasheff contended 
that the roots, instruments and forms of the direct imperative 
motivation to obey the law are exactly the same as the roots, 
instruments and forms of obedience within power structures, i.e., 
dominance, submission, unequal social interaction and power 
relationships (1939:254, 171-77). The effect of the direct 
imperative motivation to obey the law is that individuals abstain 
from conduct which they would have preferred simply because the 
law prohibits this preferred behavior and demands an opposite 
(1939:254-55). 
Timasheff expanded his fourth proposition—legal rules are 
supported by the rulers—by saying: 
The recognition of legal rules by active power centers, like any 
recognition of ethical rules, includes a tendency to impose the 
recognized rules upon the behavior of others. . . . On the other 
hand, as recognized rules are simultaneously general commands of 
the active centers, all the considerations which commonly influence 
an active center to carry out prestige policy are applicable: the 
power center must insist upon legal rules being followed by 
everyone, because their non-observance would mean disobedience, 
and disobedience undermines power structures (1939:263-4). 
Timasheff, like Austin and Ehrlich, did not assume that the 
law neutrally reflects the common interests of the populace, or 
that conformity to the law is based on consensus. Timasheff 
believed that the law reflects the interests of those who form the 
active center of the power structure, and that conformity to the 
law is often based on a direct imperative motivation—submission 
and fear of coercion. Furthermore, Timasheff cannot be fairly 
accused of ignoring the prominant role of power in the creation 
and enforcement of the law because he defines law in terms of 
power and devotes three whole chapters (1939:171-244) to a 
discussion of power. 
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MAX WEBER 
Weber's image of law contained two separate but interrelated 
aspects. First, Weber viewed law as an order-a normative system 
according to which actors mutually orient their conduct. 
According to Weber, this mutual orientation to an order includes 
the recognition that the rules or maxims of the order are binding 
on the actor, or at least that they constitute a desirable model for 
him to imitate (1947:124; 1954:3). 
Weber asserted that this recognition of the obligatory nature 
of an order may be guaranteed or upheld in a variety of ways. For 
instance, the binding force of an order may be guaranteed purely 
subjectively, and this subjective guaranty may be either affectual, 
value-rational, or religious. In addition, said Weber, the binding 
force of an order may be upheld by the expectation of certain 
external effects. In Weber's view, the binding force of the legal 
order is guaranteed in this latter manner (1947:126-28; 1954:5-6). 
An order will be called law if it is externally guaranteed by the 
probability that coercion (physical or psychological), to bring 
about conformity or avenge violation, will be applied by a staff of 
people holding themselves specially ready for that purpose 
(1954:5). 
The second aspect of Weber's image of law emphasizes the 
role of law in supporting systems of domination. Weber believed 
that the law may play a crucial role in establishing and 
perpetuating systems of domination because it can provide a 
justification for the exercise of power. Every system of 
domination or authority, argued Weber, seeks to justify itself, just 
as every person who is in a favored position feels the need to look 
upon his advantage as somehow deserved (1954:335-36). 
It is an induction from experience that no system of authority 
voluntarily limits itself to the appeal to material or affectual or 
ideal motives as a basis for guaranteeing its continuance. In 
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addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate 
the belief in its 'legitimacy' (1947:325) . 
Weber identified three principles of legitimation to which 
systems of domination may appeal in attempting to satisfy their 
strong need for self-justification. First, claims to legitimacy may 
be based on a belief in the sanctity of immemorial tradition which 
prescribes obedience to some particular person (traditional 
authority). Second, claims to legitimacy may be based on a belief 
in the exceptional character of a savior, prophet or hero and in the 
rules revealed by him (charismatic authority). Finally claims to 
legitimacy may be based on a belief in the "legality" of a system 
of rational rules and in the right of those elevated to authority 
under such rules to issue commands (legal authority). Under the 
first two principles of legitimation, obedience is given to a 
particular person, while under the last principle obedience is given 
to the rules themselves (1947:328; 1954:336). 
In addition to its role as a principle of legitimation, the law, 
in Weber's view, is intimately related to power in another way. 
The structure o f every legal order directly influences the 
distribution of power, economic or otherwise, within its respective 
community. This is true of all legal orders and not only that of the 
state. . . . Power, as well as honor, may be guaranteed by the legal 
order, but, at least normally, it is not their primary source. The 
legal order is radier an additional factor that enhances the chance 
to hold power or honor; but it cannot always secure them 
(1946:180-81). 
What is unique about Weber's discussion of power and the 
influence of the legal order on the distribution of power, is that he 
does not view power solely in terms of economic factors. "Man", 
wrote Weber, "docs not strive for power only in order to enrich 
himself economically" (1946:180). For this reason, Weber 
identified two distinct types of power structures: economic and 
social (1946:181, 194). 
The economic order refers to the way in which economic 
goods and services are used and distributed in society (1946:181). 
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Weber used the concept of class when analyzing the distribution of 
power within this type of order (1946:181-86, 194). Class 
situation, argued Weber, is ultimately market situation, and the 
two basic categories of class situations are "property" and "lack of 
property." These assertions are based on "the most elemental 
economic fact that the way in which the disposition over material 
property is distributed among a plurality of people, meeting 
competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange, in itself 
creates specific life changes" (1946:181). 
In contrast to the economic order, the social order refers to 
the way in which social honor is distributed in society 
(1946:186-194). Weber used the concept of status when 
analyzing the distribution of power within this type of order 
(1946:186-194). The key element of status is honor. 
In contrast to the purely economically determined 'class situation' 
we wish to designate as 'status situation' every typical component 
of the life fate of men that is,determined by a specific, positive or 
negative, social estimation of honor. This honor may be connected 
with any quality shared by a plurality. . .(1946:186-7). 
According to Weber, the relationship between the social 
order and the economic order is complex. Although the two 
orders are not identical, the social order nevertheless is 
conditioned by the economic order to a high degree, and in turn 
reacts back on the economic order (1946:181). Status honor may 
be linked with a class situation, but that is neither necessary nor 
inevitable. In fact, said Weber, status honor normally stands in 
sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property; both 
propertied and propcrtyless people can and frequently do belong 
to the same status group. Furthermore, social status may partly or 
even wholly determine class status, without at the same time being 
identical with it (1947:428). 
For our purposes, Weber's distinction between the economic 
order and the social order is important because Weber took the 
position that the law serves to maintain not only economic 
interests, but also status interests. 
Law and Differential Power 
Law (in the sociological sense) guarantees by no means only 
economic interests but rather the most diverse interests ranging 
from the most elementary one of personal security to such purely 
ideal goods as personal honor or the honor of the divine powers. 
Above all, it guarantees political, ecclesiastical, familial, and other 
positions of authority as well as positions of social prccminance of 
any kind which may indeed be economically conditioned or 
economically relevant in the most diverse ways, but which are 
neither economic in themselves nor sought for preponderantly 
economic ends (1954:35) . 
In short, Weber, like the other writers discussed above, did 
not adopt a pluralist-consensus image of law. Weber viewed law as 
an order whose binding force is guaranteed or upheld by the 
probability that coercion will be used to bring about conformity. 
He also recognized that the law may play a crucial role in 
establishing and perpetuating systems of domination because it 
may serve to legitimate the exercise of power. Finally, he 
acknowledged that the law protects the interests of the dominant 
groups in society, but he argued that the dominant groups are not 
necessarily economic and their interests are not necessarily 
material. 
CONCLUSION 
By reviewing the work of four leading sociological 
jurisprudents and sociologists, I have attempted to demonstrate 
that the pluralist-consensus image of law is not as pervasive as 
Sheskin contends, especially in the work of Ehrlich and Timasheff. 
I have argued that a number of sociologists and sociological 
jurisprudents assume that conformity to the law is often based on 
coercion, that the law is an instrument of power and domination, 
and that the content of the law reflects to a considerable extent 
the interests of the dominant groups in society. 
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